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AbstrAct. In this paper we propose to look into
different meanings of livability and life in Judith
butler’s thought. Although crucial for her early
work (she points to it in her 1999 Introduction to
Gender Trouble), the concept of livability as
such emerges more often and in a more pro-
nounced manner in her later books (from Undo-
ing Gender and Precarious life to Towards a
Performative Theory of Assembly). Our main
question is: what is the thread that runs through
different concepts of life in butler’s work? What
are the links between abject, unlivable, precari-
ous, ungrievable, jettisoned and dispossessed
life? this raises further questions: the question of
gradation of livability (which life matters and
‘how much’, and how to think this quantifiabil-
ity of something so unquantifiable); and the
question of universality (all lives matter). these
questions obviously need to take into account the
terms under which a life is qualified and counted
as livable. such conditions encompass the norms
that organize the possibility of recognition and
the orders of recognizability and differential al-
location of humanness. they encompass the
ways in which we are constituted politically, but
also in which this ‘we’ is social and bodily. the
question of livable life is thus very much entan-
gled with the issue of (individual) agency, but
also with what we as agents require “in order to
maintain and reproduce the conditions of (our)
own livability” (Undoing Gender 2004: 39).
Key words: Life; livability of Life; bodily On-
tology; grievable Life; jettisoned Life; precari-
ous Life.
resumen. en este ensayo, nos proponemos ex-
plorar los diferentes significados de los con-
ceptos de vivibilidad y vida en el pensamiento
de Judith butler. si bien es crucial para su obra
temprana —butler se refiere por primera vez a
este concepto en su introducción del libro, El gé-
nero en disputa de 1999—, el concepto en sí
emerge con más claridad y elaboración en su
obra tardía (Deshacer el género, Vida precaria
y Apuntes hacia una teoría performativa de
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InTroDUCTIon: mAKInG A bID for A lIVAblE lIfE
In a text written for the exhibit “uprisings,” curated by George Didi-huberman
at Paris’ Jeu de Paume, building her argumentation in favor of rebellion, Judith
butler uses the phrase “making a bid for a livable life” (butler 2017: 26). this
phrase, “making a bid”, is in a certain way the initial shibboleth and action of our
text. It is our intention to sketch the “life” path in Judith butler’s conceptual ap-
paratus, but even more, we wish to take a closer look at the crucial move that high-
lights the set of characteristics that make ‘life’ ‘livable’. Indeed, it could be said
that here is a sort of auction of relational potentialities of a life when certain philo-
sophical protocols are reinforced and profiled as a very specific articulation of
“bodily ontology” (butler 2009a: 3), followed by epistemologies of “life” in the
feminist philosophy of Judith butler.
In order to embark on an analysis indicating the places and appearances of the
word ‘life’, which form, in all their varied yet intrinsically connected attributes,
the philosophy of Judith butler, it is first necessary to list, count, distinguish, and
separate the strategies that follow the category of life in general, and then all the
elements in her texts whereby life acquires its symbolic ethical and political, but
also certainly reflexive shadings of ‘livable life’. thus the assessment and rank-
ing of various forms of life, the competition and evaluation of various life statuses,
the myriad appearances of life all become part of our task. the cards are on the
table, the chips are all in in the struggle for “something [that is] indispensable for
living with dignity or freedom” (butler 2017: 23).
We argue that ‘life’ belongs to the arsenal of butler’s main critical concepts,
and frames of War gives us justification for that, since it departs from the ques-
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asamblea). nuestra pregunta principal sería:
¿cuál es el hilo conductor que une las diferen-
tes concepciones de vida en el trabajo de butler?
¿cuáles son los lazos entre la vida abyecta, in-
vivible, precaria, indolora, desechada y despo-
seída? De estas dos preguntas surgen otras más:
como la cuestión de gradación de vivibilidad —
qué vida importa, y “cuánto,” y cómo pensar
este tipo de cuantificación de algo no-cuantifi-
cable—; y la cuestión de la universalidad (todas
las vidas importan). estas preguntas, obvia-
mente, tienen que contar con evidencias bajo las
cuales la vida es cualificada, calificada y con-
tada como vivible. estas condiciones abarcan las
normas que organizan las posibilidades de re-
conocimiento y los órdenes de reconocimiento
tanto como la distribución diferencial de la hu-
manidad. Y además engloban las maneras en las
que estamos constituidos políticamente, pero
también, las maneras en las que el “nosotros” se
define como social y corporal. La cuestión de la
vida vivible está, por ende,  enmarañada con la
problemática de la contraposición entre la vo-
luntad individual y la idea del “nosotros”, que,
como seres, necesitamos —en palabras de la
propia butler— “para mantener y reproducir
las condiciones de (nuestra) propia vivibilidad”
(Deshacer el género 2004: 39).
Palabras clave: vida; vivibilidad de  la vida; on-
tología corporal; vida digna de duelo; vida des-
echada; vida precaria.
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tion, “What is a life?” (butler 2009a: 3). Without remaining in a general ontology
of life in which its definition is determined through universal questions of life and
death, her argument advances through a meticulous vivisection of mechanisms of
power that naturalize but also denaturalize life, by blurring its various meanings
and statuses. that in turn compels us to articulate this ‘making a bid’ as a desig-
nation of the assessment of the analytic potential required for reflection on ‘life’
to performatively grow into purposeful acting with the aim of a more just and bet-
ter community.
What we propose to ask is which elements of life are counted in, and which
are not in the set that makes life ‘livable’. Is it possible to arrive at consensus re-
garding the choice of strong analytic tools that surpass ideology, to evaluate or rank
the pricelessness of a ‘life’? Is it at all possible to define the untouchable consti-
tutive elements of ‘a life’ and can these elements justify the differences in assess-
ing ‘the life’ of one who has nothing left but life itself? Do we still need to stand
on the traces of thought of negative theologies for which there is always an instance
greater than human, or is it, rather (following thinkers who have deconstructed
apophatic inference, such as buber, Levinas or Derrida...), necessary to deconstruct
the mechanisms of production of such higher instances that serve to justify given
negative hierarchies? clearly, one of the first tasks of feminist philosophy is the
analysis and criticism of existing negative constitutive structures. It seems to us
that Judith butler develops her thought precisely in that direction by examining
and deconstructing relational categories of such ‘operations of power’ and their
structures.
We argue that one such feminist philosophy of life assumes a specific bodily
ontology, and further insists on an insurrection on the level of ontology. In other
words, life has to be thought as inherently attached to the body, but at the same
time, as de-biologized; as the carrier and vessel of life, which in its finitude seeks
to overcome its own form. At the same time, we have to bear in mind the social-
ity an embodied life is imbued with: “[t]o be alive or, indeed, to be ‘attached’ to
life would mean to be attached to one’s own dissolution or, indeed, to discover that
life is never exclusively one’s own” (butler, malabou 2011: 637). When ‘life’ be-
gins to be considered in the phrase ‘livable life’, we are inquiring after the nor-
mative conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for life to become ‘life’. Insisting
on the formulation of a ‘bodily ontology’, butler announces her intention to crit-
ically examine “precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, ex-
posure, bodily persistence, desire, work and the claims of language and social be-
longing” (butler 2009a: 3). the phrase, ‘bodily ontology’, then, comprises a
whole slew of nouns that indicate specific states or manifestations bodies take, or
that take place in bodies. none of these various states is accidental. they can be
said to encompass, in a semantically open associative range, ontological uncertainty
the trajectories of the concept of Life in Judith butler’s thought
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(to which we are exposed as precarious), incompleteness (as disarmed before the
fullness of being), essential defenselessness to the law, necessary dependence on
others who could go missing at any point, that is, the necessity of facing others,
being with others, and for others. by introducing ‘bodily persistence’, all these
states acquire a temporal dimension through the paradox of understanding dura-
tion despite finitude.
In shifting from bodily persistence to ‘desire’ and then to “work and the
claims of language and social belonging,” butler borrows from the philosophical
tradition that has shaped her thinking, while also criticizing it in the process. In what
follows, we will show that particular textual strategies, present from Subjects of
Desire to notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, have formed and ar-
ticulated conditions of livability of life, while carefully building up its affective,
ethical and political dispositions. In nearly every text of hers, as well as her pre-
cise, but not necessarily explicitly directed readings of hegel, Kojeve, marx, Al-
thusser, benjamin, Foucault, the French feminists, but also Arendt, Derrida, and
contemporaries who have reflected upon life, it is possible to find butler’s specific
grammar and syntax which makes life livable. the life that she thematizes certainly
does not precede social and linguistic formulations of life, since, “sociality con-
ditions and interrupts each and every apparently intimate and immediate relation
I might have to my existence” (butler, malabou 2011: 638).
GooD lIfE
What is then a livable life? the answer lies scattered across Judith butler’s works.
We will, however, begin with the claim from notes Toward a Performative The-
ory of Assembly, where she equates the livable with the good life (butler 2015:
208). One might at first wonder what could be good in livability. Is it not possi-
ble to live a shadow life or a life of the living dead? A life that is an endlessly pro-
longed survival is livable as much as it is lived. Livability might designate mere
perseverance, unintended and unwilled ability to live, obstinacy of the body in en-
during the unendurable. there seems to be hardly anything inherently good in the
body’s capacity not to die, to be live-able. clearly, the concept of livability needs
to involve much more than that.
butler’s relatively recent insistence on a good life may offer a clue on how to
read livability, almost against the very term. First, such an attribute implies that there
is a life which is not good, a life lived against the odds and despite the fact that it
cannot be lived. second, if we allow for the move from the ethical to the political,
a good life may refer to more than one life, one’s individual life, indeed it may sug-
gest that there also have to be other good lives that of necessity intersect with my
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life and impact upon it. In that sense, for my own life to be good, there has to be
either a community of those leading good life, or a political infrastructure that en-
ables something good to emerge from the sheer fact that we are living beings. third,
life in itself, a life which would somehow precede or transcend the multifarious lev-
els and forms of support (institutional and infrastructural, ranging from the avail-
ability of an irrigation system, the restoration of the ozone layer, to a just govern-
ment and caring communities), also does not merit a name of a good life.
behind the good life trope one hears several of butler’s interlocutors: benjamin,
socrates via Arendt, and Adorno, among others. We find benjamin’s differentia-
tion between Dasein and gerechtes Dasein, his insistence on the falsity and ig-
nominy of the proposition that existence, or mere life (bloẞes leben), stands higher
than just existence – that “nonexistence of man is something more terrible than the
(admittedly subordinate) not-yet-attained condition of the just man” (benjamin
1978: 251). butler claims that “we cannot struggle for a good life, a livable life,
without meeting the requirements that allow a body to persist… And yet, that de-
mand proves insufficient since we survive precisely in order to live, and life, as
much as it requires survival, must be more than survival in order to be livable” (but-
ler 2015: 208). Furthermore, one life, my life “is and is not my own, and this is what
makes me a social creature, and a living one” (ibid, 200). no life can be led out-
side a community – we live with, or for, or by virtue of others. A good life cannot
be removed from the company of others, other lives whose livability affects the
scope and content of what makes my life livable. no life is livable on its own, and
differential allocation of values to lives affects my understanding of what a good
life is. If Adorno wondered how is one to lead a good/right life (richtiges leben)
in a bad/false one, implying that society we live in creates obstacles to moral liv-
ing (Freyenhagen 2014), butler contends that a good life, an affirmed life is in-
separable from a critical examination of the structures that differentially value life
itself (butler 2015: 199).
the livable life thus functions as a not-yet-attained life, even if my life seems
quite livable. It functions as a regulative ideal more than as an achieved state of
humanity, even if some portions of humanity regulate their life critically and with
an ideal in mind. Livability is constituted – albeit not determined – by a certain
lack, by a certain negation of the possibility to live. For that reason, there are any
number of instances of – and names for – the not livable in butler’s thought, even
in those works where livability as such does not figure as an especially prominent
term. Abject, unintelligible, ungrievable, jettisoned, precarious and dispossessed
are but names for a bad life and environment that precludes an individual from lead-
ing a good life. hence our decision to begin our consideration of livable life with
the only positive reference to it, that is good life.
the trajectories of the concept of Life in Judith butler’s thought
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GrIEVED lIfE
A good life is, above all, a life that is grievable. this proposition may seem too
hyperbolic, ethically too elusive, politically too timid. however, we would argue
that butler’s oft repeated question – whose lives do and do not matter as lives? –
underpinning her understanding of equality and social transformation, is closely
related to the issue of grief. Grief becomes the central affect in the struggle for equal
livability, almost its prerequisite. Also, the thread of grievability appears in but-
ler’s early texts, tying them with her latest considerations, i.e. the political man-
agement of the differential allocation of humanness. 
In frames of War, butler famously wrote that “grievability is a presupposition
for the life that matters” (butler 2009a: 14). In order to be regarded as life, as some-
thing sustainable, apprehended, as mattering, a life needs to be grievable: its loss
matters before its actual ending; its loss constitutes its value before it even began.
butler speaks here of war and of lives lost or losable during military operations.
but the very same idea appears more than a decade prior to frames of War and
in an entirely different context. Grief is, namely, present already in bodies that mat-
ter, conjoined with the domain of the abject, of bodies not qualified as viable:
“What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm produce to a symbolic
hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that
matter, ways of living that count as ‘life,’ lives worth protecting, lives worth sav-
ing, lives worth grieving?” (butler 1993: xxiv).
Grief is an uncanny candidate for defining what equality is. If we, however, re-
main skeptical towards the idea that equality is or can become an imposable state,
systemically produced by the neat workings of a certain political regime or an in-
stitutional arrangement, then the usual definitions fail us. total enfranchisement and
gradual legal extensions within the domain of equality – necessary as they certainly
are – have not yet suspended structural inequality or the systemic deprivation of the
privilege of ontology to certain kinds of beings. Laying claim to ontology, being
counted or qualifying as real or viable (meijer and Prins 1998: 280), implies a dif-
ferent judgment on equality, such that does not invoke only equal status, rights and
opportunities, but also the absence of gradation of humanity. In other words, if all
men are created equal – and recognized as such by their respective states – how
come that certain lives are still unequal, illegible, unknowable, and unfelt? One pos-
sible answer is that, formal equality notwithstanding, there still is an erratic sepa-
rator between lives worth living and those worth destroying, lives deemed valuable
and grievable, and those devalued and ungrievable (butler 2009a: 22).
how does grief work? On the one hand, grief is a deeply psychic, inner and pri-
vate state which involves overflows of protracted emotional emptiness and fullness.
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On the other, it becomes deprivatized through its diverse socially mediated ex-
pressions. Grief related affectivity often has recognized and ritualized public forms
and forums. Although it may be used for political purposes, grief is not an institu-
tionally arrangeable act – one cannot be ordered to feel grief, or requested to grieve
(although one can feign or simulate it). but that does not mean that grievability can-
not be imposed or induced. Individual ability to feel grief, mediated by the shared
belief that somethings and someones ought to be grieved (while some others ought
not), is established and maintained through various exclusionary practices of ef-
facement and denominalization (butler 2004b: 38; see also Athanasiou 2017).
such exclusionary practices are integral to a highly rigid regulatory frame that
congeals over time, repeatedly producing the appearance of a substance, and hence
of something seemingly natural; these practices function as norms that define
what is able to appear, to be thought of as natural or qualifiable in the domain of
cultural intelligibility.1 exclusionary practices contribute to the differential distri-
bution of what is intelligible and set the limits to a publicly acknowledged field of
appearance. thus certain lives appear before us as visible, knowable, even close.
they appear in the public; their appearance constitutes the very meaning of the pub-
lic, of the visible and intelligible. And when they cease to appear, or disappear, we
feel loss. We grieve, or we at least feel allowed to feel grief. On the other hand, there
are also lives, less visible or invisible, faceless or effaced, lives that never make it
into the obituaries, those most public forms of mourning – remaining unburied, if
not unburiable (butler 2004b: 34). the fragmented visibility of such lives suggests
that they are in some ways unintelligible, or that their intelligibility is foreclosed
to us. Although these lives may belong to my fellow citizens or to the fellow hu-
mans endowed with equally binding human rights, to people who inhabit the
spaces in my vicinity or are in other ways close to me (despite the fact that I may
wish to scornfully repudiate any such closeness), these lives register differently in
terms of their possibility. butler designates such unlivable and uninhabitable zones
of social life – otherwise densely populated – as the domain of the abject (butler
1993: xiii), the domain that circumscribes the space that is visible, and where the
loss of life is grievable. not being admitted into public view, or being framed out
of view, makes these lives unintelligible as lives. hence, when an ungrievable life
perishes, it is sometimes as if it had never really been at all. Its abjectness allows
us to feel no grief, and what is more, to feel allowed to ungrieve it.
there are thus gradations of humanity that go far beyond the level of legally
produced equality. such equality tries to ameliorate deep ontological and episte-
mological deprivations still in place. some lives, be they, for example, lives of
1 the definition provided here combines butler’s definitions of gender (butler 1999: 45) and
sex (butler 1993: xii).
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women or trans people or lives of other sexual minorities whose bodily integrity
is exposed to a constant threat of violence; or lives of people who were historically
considered only a fraction of the human life (Yancy and butler 2015), such as black
in the us (who under slavery were legally framed not as humans but as animated
chattel); or the lives of enemy civilians in the course of military operations, etc.
those lives are less entitled to grievability. they are human only in a limited sense,
because certain exclusionary practices that help define what is normatively human
are still in place.
Grievable death is the flip side of livable life. Lives may be only differentially
livable if all deaths are not at least potentially grievable. that may mean that equal-
ity in grievability becomes a regulative ideal of livability. changing the matrices
and registers under which unintelligible lives become legible, both legally and on-
tologically, reveals not only the historical conditions of their becoming unintelli-
gible, but also the power relations that organize the space of public appearance,
publicly tolerated grief and, conversely, enforced unlivability.
To JETTISon A lIfE
bad lives seem confined to certain spaces. they do live somewhere physically, per-
haps even in our midst, but they do not appear as lives worth grieving over: their
sheer physicality does not grant them recognition. such lives may be deprived of
legal and/or ontological subjecthood. When they do not qualify as properly gen-
dered or having clear borders of materiality, they may be relegated to the domain
of the abject. they may be deployed in an unspeakable, unviable, nonnarrativiz-
able belt; they populate a ‘constitutive outside’ which provides borders for that
which is deemed properly human, properly livable (butler 1993: 140, xiii). they
are out of sight because they are systematically framed out of view: in ghettos, in
prisons, in hiding, on border crossings. they may be mediatized as sacrificable
lives, terrorist lives, lives of enemies rightfully crushed and vanquished. Or they
may be understood as scattered illegal lives that combine the reified life of a thing
with a willfully felonious person, for which reason they are rightfully deportable
and expungable to some vague elsewhere.
the way these lives are organized, managed through governmental and non-
governmental means, differentiated and differentially disposed to precarity, belongs
to the sphere of biopolitics that “establishes a set of measures for the differential val-
uation of life itself” (butler 2015: 196). biopolitically devalued lives are certainly
not ‘good’. Perhaps then one might equate such lives with what Agamben defined
as the ‘bare life’? Perhaps the distinction between zoe (nothing but life, a simple
fact of living, a mere life that can be reproduced) and bios, a qualified and politi-
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cally recognized life, life within the polity, can also find its application here? With
her insistence on unlivability, butler would maybe then also subscribe to Agamben’s
thesis that the fundamental categorical dyad of Western politics is that of “bare
life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion” (Agamben 1995: 12). 
non-appearance of lives in spaces where grievability is publicly sanctioned,
where lives are publicly sanctioned, hints towards such a conclusion. both Agam-
ben and butler read Arendt carefully, and for Arendt the public implies that some-
thing can be both seen and heard by everybody, because it belongs to the world
itself, to a world “as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our private
place in it” (Arendt 1998: 50, 52). It is only in public that speech and action, “the
modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects,
but qua men” (ibid: 176), can be enacted, and whereby the “mere bodily existence”
becomes transformed into a political being – the human proper. Yet, butler and
Agamben read Arendt differently.
For butler, lives removed from the public do not reside in some indistinct zones
excluded from the domain of the political. they are also never pure physical ob-
jects, divested of agency. their tentative naturalness is already fundamentally po-
litical. Is there a human life that is ever only natural; or must we see its tentative
naturalness as an effect of diverse, fundamentally political processes of natural-
ization which posit certain lives as always and necessarily pre-political, consigned
to the realm of the private? “Politics,” butler claims, “is not defined as taking place
exclusively in the public sphere, distinct from the private one, but it crosses the
lines again and again, bringing attention to the way that politics is already in the
home” (butler 2015: 71) within the private. If naturalization is a complex set of
effects deeply embroiled with the biopolitical ordering of livability, then no life
is ever truly ‘bare’.
unlivability is not only always within the political – it is what defines the terms
and the stakes of the political domain. the matrices according to which lives are
organized and managed within the different levels of precarity, but also visibility,
belong to the domain of political “power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” (Foucault 2003:
241). they are also firmly embedded in the changing constellations of sovereignty
and governmentality, specific to our own time. Finally, they are framed by the his-
torically conditioned assessments of the scope of applicability of the idea of the hu-
man. such frames are produced and reproduced by the norms and practices, dis-
cursive and non-discursive, which normatively constrain our understanding of who
belongs to the political community, what is the meaning of the rights of those who
belong, what are their legal entitlements, as well as the placement of the border be-
tween the political and the non- or pre-political (even if there is no such border, even
if its construction belongs to the very mechanics of the political).
the trajectories of the concept of Life in Judith butler’s thought
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Despite the fact that they do not equally form or contribute to the realm of the
public –the realm where having a voice, acting and appearing is politically rec-
ognized (or allowed by the state)– these lives are nonetheless centrally implicated
in the workings of the political. thus, instead of ‘bare life’, a life that is somehow
outside the polity (butler 2007: 36), which in fact depends on an exclusionary logic
which depoliticizes life, butler proposes another notion. her jettisoned life refers
to a precarious unlivability, saturated in the political.
A life that can be jettisoned is a life that may be discarded, dumped, thrown
away. It is a load or burden that may be inconsequentially cast overboard, light-
ening a vessel in order to improve its stability in an emergency. such life is not
expendable because all contemporary lives are ill-fated such that they could po-
tentially be reduced to some biological minimum, which is what we encounter in
Agamben.2 these modern-day jettisoned lives – lives of the refugees, detainees,
the stateless, illegal immigrants, unpaid laborers, precarious workers (much like
in Ancient times women, slaves and metics) – are not outside the political in their
dispossession. butler is emphatic: “this is not bare life, but a particular formation
of power and coercion that is designed to produce and maintain the condition, the
state, of the dispossessed” (butler 2007: 5).
being jettisoned out of the public, foreclosed from the public, or framed out
of public view, does not mean that certain lives are bare. they are neither re-
duced to mere living, nor expunged from the political. they are steeped and
mired in power, although “not with modes of entitlements or obligation” (ibid:
32). their unlivability is produced within a framework which defines politics
as founded on the distinction between zoe and bios, exclusion and inclusion,
as if the boundaries between these were not in themselves political, volatile and
shifting. however, being jettisoned from the public does not mean that one is
outside the political: there is no ‘outside’ to the political – one can only be qual-
ified as a load that can be thrown overboard, or as a treasured cargo that defines
the purpose of a voyage. various “spectral humans deprived of ontological
weight and failing the tests of social intelligibility required for minimal recog-
nition” (ibid: 16) indeed do not qualify for status of livable life, that is status
of cherished cargo. Yet, they do qualify for the status of the one not-belonging;
and as such, they are produced and presupposed as jettisoned, as an interior-
ized outside.
2 “If there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are
all virtually homines sacri” (Agamben 1998: 68). We may, however, also bear in mind that such
notion of modern bare life, wounded, expendable, and endangered, can rather be seen as the re-
mainder of the destroyed political bios (Ziarek 2008: 90), which never belonged to certain lives,
which were still for that reason not reducible to zoē.
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PrECArITy AnD DISPoSSESSIon
In Who Sings the nation State? butler examines the accorded status of non-be-
longing to those who are produced and paralyzed in their dispossession – the state-
less. they are an emblematic instance of one “both expelled and contained, as sat-
urated with power precisely at the moment in which it is deprived of citizenship”
(ibid: 40). such spectral humans, stateless within a state (incarcerated, stuck in in-
ternment camps, residing and laboring illegally, but also, in some other respects,
those deprived of recognition in their gender), remain stateless but still under the
control of state power. they are without legal protection, yet not relegated to a ‘bare
life’, they lack the minimum conditions for a livable life with regard to human life,
but are still not reducible to minimum biological form of living (butler 2004a: 39).
such spectral humans are constituted as deprived, wanting, placeless and dispos-
sessed within the political itself. 
Associated with all these attributes is precarity. One is not precarious in an
imaginable ‘outside’ of the politics, in a space where there is no protection and no
support at all, and where lives are nothing but a voiceless act of breathing. Quite
the contrary, precarity appears only when the minimum conditions for a livable life
with regard to human life become disputed to certain portions of humanity. In a
way, precarity works as an indicator: it reveals that there are conditions that pro-
vide persistence and flourishing – integral to a good life – and that they are at the
same time differentially distributed. Derived from Latin legal jargon, ‘precarious’
referred to something “obtained by praying” (bojanić 2016: 71), something which
has already been there (for some), but is essentially inaccessible (to others) with-
out solicitation, begging, or prayer. those who have to beg, who are marked by
precarity, are variously dispossessed of the means to persist and flourish.
What is precarious life? A book with the same title combined butler’s abid-
ing concern with grievability with the newly established conditions of height-
ened vulnerability and aggression. It is here that interdependency becomes ex-
plicitly recognized as the basis for global political community (followed by a
concession – “I confess to not knowing how to theorize that interdependency”
[butler 2004b: xii–xiii] – which will strongly direct her further endeavors). In-
terdependency is fundamentally related to the engagement with livability, be-
cause only a “social network of hands”, could eventually minimize the unliv-
ability of lives (butler 2015: 67). “the idea of interdependency of lives that are
mutually implicated in one another already establishes a principle of equality and
connectedness” (butler and Athanasiou 2013: 107). And it is through the idea
of interdependency too that one reveals the double valence of the idea of pre-
carity and dispossession.
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butler distinguishes between precariousness and precarity to emphasize this
double valence. Discussing, with Levinas, the precariousness of another’s life, she
suggests that life itself is precarious (butler 2004b: 134). through our dependency
on others, which comes from our (sometimes utterly unwilled) attachment and ex-
posure to other people, precariousness defines our bodies and our selves as socially
constituted (ibid: 20). In addition, our dependency on institutions and infrastruc-
ture that prop us up and enable some of our most fundamental rights to at all be
exercised – acting in that sense as the heteronomic condition of possibility of au-
tonomy – further reveal the precariousness of human life. We are precarious in the
sense that we are exposed, simply by virtue of living, to constant injury and loss.
We are vulnerable in our dependency, and this is the precarity we all share equally,
as a trait that cannot be reversed. 
but there is also the other valence of precarity. norms which frame some lives
as unintelligible and ungrievable, and institutions that have the power to produce
jettisoned life and life in dispossession, distribute precarity differentially. Precar-
ity causes and exacerbates gradation of livability and its differential saturation in
power. In other words, all lives are precarious because they ‘beg’ for solid infras-
tructure in which they could embed themselves, and for attachments that will not
lead to their utter destruction. however, not all precarious lives live in precarity
as a politically enforced “condition of induced inequality and destitution” (butler
and Athanasiou 2013: 20). We all share the condition of precariousness equally,
but the condition of precarity is what makes our lives unequally precarious. 
the notion of dispossession also carries a double valence. Dispossession is both
something that defines what life is, on condition that it is always and inevitably
lived among others, and something that defines a profound and troubling lack,
which further induces precarity. the relations we depend on, many of which we
never choose, constitute and dispossess us at the same time (butler 2004a: 24).
through dispossession, by accepting relationality and interdependence as the ba-
sis for autonomy, we understand how being with, for, and by virtue of others de-
fines our very selves. there is, so to speak, no I with a you, and my life is moored
in and dispossessed by the life of another. A life which is never entirely mine, never
truly in my possession, which is “outside from the start” (butler and Athanasiou
2013: 5), also opens itself to the other meaning of dispossession, the one that en-
tails loss, deprivation, want, placelessness, any of which is, more often than not,
enforced through violence.
to say that lives are precarious or dispossessed is to stress the conditions within
which lives, as complex processes of living, are able or unable to evolve, continue
and thrive. “If we are beings who can be deprived of place, livelihood, shelter, food,
and protection, if we can lose our citizenship, our homes, and our rights, then we
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are fundamentally dependent on those powers that alternately sustain or deprive
us, and that hold a certain power over our very survival” (ibid: 4). Precarious lives,
or simply lives, are not entirely livable – even if they are lived – unless various
normative conditions are not politically fulfilled for livable life to be secured. If
one needs to beg for a certain kind of futurity, if one is accorded status of human
that lacks the potential to flourish, even if it persists in the unendurable, then per-
haps no prayer can save one from precarization.
to define life as precarious, dispossessed, caught in the intricate web of inter-
dependencies, is to disavow the individual self-sufficient, sovereign life, as much
as it is to dismiss life as the mere biological minimum. Lives take place; they also
take time. the place they take is conditioned socio-economically for physical per-
sistence (some will be born in magnificent hospitals, some in arid fields or in in-
ternment camps; some will live in prosperity, some in destitution; some will die
in dignity, while some may never find their way to obituaries). the time we are
born into and live in is constituted, albeit not determined, by frames of intelligi-
bility and recognizability, which we did not choose. Yet they make our life on earth
counted more or less.
thus the struggle for livability, “the ability to sustain a viable life in conditions
of inherent precariousness and the socio-political operation of precarity” (mcnailly
2015: 150), seeks a different kind of politicization of ontology, such that it does
not configure in advance who counts as human and who does not (butler and
Athanasiou 2013: 120). the struggle for livability requires much more than the ex-
pansion of the domain of the human based on gradual broadening of the space of
those ‘included’, ‘counted’, and ‘qualified’. such struggle in fact assumes an “in-
surrection at the level of ontology, a critical opening up of the questions, What is
real? Whose lives are real? how might reality be remade?” (butler 2004b: 33). An
ontology which counts and discounts, based on an exclusionary frame of belong-
ing, autonomy, and self-mastery – ontology of individualism – has to be called into
question, because “there is no life without the conditions of life that variably sus-
tain life, and those conditions are pervasively social, establishing not the discrete
ontology of the person, but rather the interdependency of persons, involving re-
producible and sustaining social relations, and relations to the environment and to
non-human forms of life, broadly considered” (butler 2009a: 19).
the life that is precarious or dispossessed is not a good life or a life that can
be lived so long as there are politically articulated forces, norms, social and po-
litical organizations developed historically in order to allocate precariousness and
dispossession differentially. the new social, bodily ontology butler calls for, will
therefore need to rearticulate performativity in terms of precarity, since “there is
no reproduction of the social world that is not at the same time a reproduction of
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those norms that govern the intelligibility of the body in space and time” (butler
2009b: x).
What takes place when the uncounted begin to count themselves – not merely
enumerating their own ‘wounded attachments’, their specific identity claims, but
by thoroughly changing the very terms of appearance, the very meaning of the pub-
lic, of the frames which differentially accord statuses of belonging and non-be-
longing, is “performativity within precarity and against its differential allocation”
(butler and Athanasiou 2013: 101). Performativity and precarity have therefore ev-
erything to do with each other, and it is the question, who counts as a life worth
grieving and sheltering, that provides this link (butler 2009b: iv, xii). moreover,
“the performative emerges as the specific power of the precarious… to demand
the end of their precarity” (butler and Athanasiou 2013: 121).
PErformATIVE PrECArITy 
We began our exploration into livability by referring to butler’s very recent text
“can One Lead a Good Life in a bad One?” Its title seemed to revolve around a
decidedly ethical stance. but the two problems posited at its very beginning com-
plicated the matter: butler asks how to live one’s life well if good life is system-
atically foreclosed to so many, and how the historical time which shapes our un-
derstanding of that question conditions the form of the question itself (butler 2015:
193–194)? Adorno, whom butler chooses to evoke when she offers her single pos-
itive reference to a livable life, believed that norms and moral principles have al-
ways replicated social domination, and that in the false totality of advanced cap-
italist society, good life is not possible (schweppenhäuser 2004: 328). still, unlike
Adorno, butler seems resolved to struggle for a regulative ideal of a livable life.
In one such struggle, the ethical cannot be disentangled from the political, or from
the wider framework that produces reified ontological configurations of (un)liv-
ability. And the political, the structuring of the world through inequality, ex-
ploitation and forms of effacement, cannot be transformed without insurrection at
the level of ontology.
As we have shown, Judith butler’s understanding of life, and livable life in par-
ticular, has had a long trajectory. Its first appearances can be gleaned as early as
Subjects of Desire, in butler’s reading of hegel’s concept of life, where she inverts
the dynamic particularity of hegel’s subject claiming that it “concludes that the
proper object of desire is Life” (butler 1987: 36). here, as well, one finds a sketch
of what would later become ‘bodily ontology’. namely, desire is the engine with-
out which the subject cannot be constituted, yet nor can it be self-sufficient; it rather
must emerge into the world to acquire its definite form: “this [hegel’s] subject does
not yet know its own ‘livelihood’, its capacity to create and dissolve shape...” (ibid).
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We find here what would later become the ‘bid for a livable life’. the pathway
through which the body’s ‘livelihood’ acquires its Gestalt (and Gestalt for hegel
is the formation of consciousness) is the very same emancipatory process neces-
sary for the acquisition of elements of human life with the potential to form hu-
manity’s ‘bios’. 
the ontological element of livability is, in return, always already political; hence
the question of context. Our understanding of Adorno’s question is framed by the
time of consolidation of an unprecedented political rationality which induces fierce
precarization (brown 2015). It is a time of precarity solidifying into a regime, a
hegemonic mode of governing and being governed, which uses managerial tac-
tics and exploitation to acclimatize populations to fear and insecurity (butler in
Lorey 2015: ii, xi). this is a time when false universalism, chanted in the slogan
“All lives matter,” once again becomes a means to write off myriad lives marked
as producers of insecurity. Ours is a time when majorities accuse the most vul-
nerable, those whose life is normatively abject, ungrievable, jettisoned, for their
own heightened vulnerability. 
In such times, insurrectionaries have to use precarity as activism, and precar-
ity itself needs to become a site of alliance (butler 2015: 27), with livable inter-
dependency as its regulative goal. such an alliance is of course an alliance in the
name of equal livability, but its immediate effects may be utterly troublesome: high
risk and errancy seem constitutive of such an insurrection, and injury, detention,
and death are never far removed from it (one should only remember Ayotzinapa;
see batler 2016). there is nothing inherently celebratory in precarity as activism:
such activism is always potentially dangerous and may annihilate life. however,
its emergence and urgency speaks volumes about our times, when the reigning on-
tologies of individualism fall patently short, because even the basic support for per-
sistence – let alone flourishing – become rigidly foreclosed to many whose lives
are without entitlement (or whose entitlement might be removed with ease and in
the name of greater security), although they remain mired in power. 
Yet, if they, the spectral lives accorded non-belonging, burst into sight and re-
sist being removed from it, then jettisoned life becomes jettisoned not in an inte-
riorized outside, but onto the heart of the public sphere (Zaharijević 2016: 11). If
the spectral lives gather in order to protest their invisibility – the decimated bod-
ily existence of unrecognizability and unintelligibility – then their bodily presence
disrupts and unsettles both their own induced spectrality and the very public where-
from they have been jettisoned. When precarity enacts itself in performative as-
semblies – in plural form of agency and social resistance practices – the very terms
of the public become altered. What is then exposed in the public is not an aggre-
gate of certain individual bad lives, but their bodily exposure of the fact that the
social and economic organization of life is bad.
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